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“If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. Nothing would be what it
is, because everything would be what it isn’t. And contrary wise, what is, it wouldn’t be.
And what it wouldn’t be, it would. You see?”,
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland

Abstract
In this dissertation we present a model for iteration of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s Update,
inspired in the developments for iteration in AGM belief revision. We adapt Darwiche
and Pearls’ postulates of iterated belief revision to update (as well as the independence
postulate proposed in [BM06, JT07]) and show two families of such operators, based in
natural [Bou96] and lexicographic revision [Nay94a, NPP03]. In all cases, we provide a
possible worlds semantics of the models.
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Resumo
Nesta dissertac¸a˜o e´ apresentado um modelo para a iterac¸a˜o de Update de acordo com a
definic¸a˜o de Katsuno e Mendelzon, inspirado nos desenvolvimentos da iterac¸a˜o na revisa˜o
de crenc¸as AGM. Sera˜o adaptados para iterac¸a˜o de update os postulados para iterac¸a˜o de
revisa˜o de crenc¸as de Darwiche e Pearl (bem como o postulado de Independeˆncia proposto
em [BM06, JT07]) e sera˜o mostradas duas famı´lias de tais operadores, baseadas na revisa˜o
Natural [Bou96] e Lexicogra´fica [Nay94a, NPP03]. Em todos os casos sera´ apresentada
uma semaˆntica de mundos possı´veis.
Palavras-chave:
Revisa˜o de Crenc¸as, Update de Crenc¸as, Modelo de Update de Kastuno e Mendelzon,
Iterac¸a˜o, Semaˆntica de mundos possı´veis
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Historic Background
Belief change is the process through which an agent should revise its beliefs upon the
arising of new information and it is present in our day to day lives. Even though we are
not aware, changes occur all around us, second after second for every second that passes
by. These changes lead to a constant renewal of our beliefs. We end up accepting new
beliefs, revising old ones and even eliminating some. In humans these changes occur
naturally, they are a part of our nature and of the way our brain functions.
It is only natural that with the development of computer science, machines are
expected to react the same way whenever there is a change in the environment or even
when the environment changes, giving us consistent outcomes, just as a human brain
would do. However, the formalization of this problem is not simple, due to the fact that
there isn’t an unique way to perform these changes.
The belief change study, when referred to in its wide sense, has been a subject of
interest for almost as long as man itself exists. In the modern age, the most various works
primarily originated in two large research traditions: philosophy and computer science.
Numerous contributions in the field of artificial intelligence were given by researchers
as Alexander Borgida, Mukesh Dalal, Stuart Shapiro, Ken Satoh and Marianne Winslett
[Bor85, Dal88a, MS88, Sat88, Win88]. In the philosophical field, the great breakthrough
occurred with the works of Isaac Levi [Lev77], William Harper [Har77] and Georg
Henrik von Wright [vW71]. Through the study of the mechanisms by which scientific
theories are developed, philosophers proposed criteria of rationality for revisions of
probability assignments, providing much of the basic formal framework of belief change.
It was, however, the work of Carlos Alchourro´n, David Makinson and Peter Ga¨rden-
fors that promoted the development of the belief change study area primarily in the
philosophical field. The first two researchers were studying the changes in legal codes,
analysing the logical structure of the derogation procedure of a norm contained in a
legal code [AM81], that is, the process of eliminating a norm from the legal code
(derogation is the term used in the deontic context and is similar to contraction when
talking in theory change). They wanted to find the general principles that any derogation
1
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should satisfy, and define a family of all the possible ones. Basically, given a code A,
a partial order between the norms of A should be created, inducing an order on the
set of parts of A. The maximal sets of A that did not involve the norm to be removed
were called “remainders”. An year later [AM82] they extended the problem, studying
not a set of norms but an arbitrary set of formulae. The problem now was how to
eliminate one of the formulae or one of the consequences of the set. They analyzed two
different ways to contract a theory by means of remainder sets: Maxichoise and Full Meet.
At almost the same time Peter Ga¨rdenfors, a researcher from the same study area as
Alchourro´n and Makinson, was interested in the connections between belief change and
conditional sentences [Ga¨r78]. He was looking for a model for explanations and believed
that these could be expressed as different types of conditional sentences. The influence
he received from the philosophers Levi and Harper led him to make an exhaustive study
of epistemic conditionals. Ga¨rdenfors was looking for a semantic for the epistemic
conditionals that had to be based on belief states and belief changes. He defined a set of
postulates that change functions should satisfy [Ga¨r82].
In 1985, considering the closeness of their ideas, these three researchers united forces
and wrote a paper called “On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and
Revision Function” [AGM85] where they conceived the famous “AGM” model: a new
and formal framework that 30 years later continues to be the subject of significant study
and development and remains the core of the belief change theory, acquiring the status of
a standard model of belief change.
Given its properties, the AGM model inspired many researchers to propose extensions
and generalizations as well as applications and connections with other fields (for an
overview of these proposals see [FH11]). One of these extensions was iterated change: a
drawback of the AGM definition of revision is that the conditions for the iteration of the
process are very weak, and this is caused by the lack of expressive power of belief sets.
In order to ensure good properties for the iteration of the revision process, one needs a
more complex structure. So shifting from belief sets to epistemic states was proposed
by Darwiche and Pearl in [DP96]. In this framework, it is possible to define interesting
iterated revision operators. Although there exists several ways to introduce iteration in
the AGM operators (for an overview see [Pep14]), our dissertation will be based on that
of Darwiche and Pearl.
In 1992, Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) presented a type of operator of change that
they called update [KM92]. Whereas AGM operators are suited to capture changes that
reflect evolving knowledge about a static situation, the KM-update operators are intended
to represent changes in beliefs that result from changes in the objects of belief. The
difference was pointed out for the first time by Keller and Winslett [KW85] (in the context
of relational databases) and is captured in the following example [Win88]:
Initially the agent knows that there is either a book on the table (p) or a mag-
azine on the table (q), but not both.
Case 1: The agent is told that there is a book on the table. She concludes that
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there is no magazine on the table. This is revision.
Case 2: The agent is told that subsequently a book has been put on the table.
In this case she should not conclude that there is no magazine on the table.
This is update.
In this dissertation we propose to analyze iteration in the context of update, inspired
in AGM revision. An important difference between AGM revision and KM-update is
that belief revision is a local operation in the sense that a revision function is defined just
for the current belief set and the language. KM-update, on the other hand, is a global
operator defined for the set of all the possible belief sets and the language. Since update
is defined as a global operator, an operator  is defined for all the possible belief sets ϕ.
Consequently, in a first view, iteration is not a problem since pϕ  αq  β is well defined.
However, what happens if we want to make changes in our preferences as a consequence
of updating by α? In that case we can define a new operator α to reflect these changes.
This implies that, pϕαqβ and ϕα β are different operations (in the conclusion section
we will show this difference).
This dissertation will first describe the AGM Model and the modified postulates of
AGM, as defined by Katsuno and Mendelzon [KM91]. Some revision models will be
characterized. On Chapter 3 iterated belief revision will be explained using the work of
Darwiche and Pearl [DP96] as well as the Independence Postulate proposed by Booth
and Meyer and by Jin and Thielscher in [BM06, JT07]). Two different families of
operators for iterated revision (based in Natural [Bou96] and Lexicographic revision
[Nay94a, NPP03]) will be presented.
On Chapter 4 one can find the definition of the KM-update, as well as some update
operators, common in the literature of this theme. Chapter 5 will present the goal of this
work, that is, the adaptation of the Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates of iterated belief
revision to iterated update.
The dissertation will be concluded on Chapter 6, which is dedicated to some discus-
sion about its content.
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
The “AGM” Theory
2.1 Formal preliminaries
We denote by L the set of formulas of a propositional language built over a finite set
of propositional variables P . The elements of L are denoted by lower case Greek
letters α, β,. . . (possibly with subscripts). The set of valuation functions from the set of
propositional variables into the boolean set t0, 1upfalse, trueq is denoted V .
We write ω |ù α when a valuation ω P V satisfies a formula α, i.e.when ω is a model
of α. The set of models of a formula α is denoted by rrαss. If M is a set of models we
denote by αM a formula such that rrαM ss  M . When the size of M is small we often
omit the braces, by writing, e.g., αω,ω1 instead of αtω,ω1u. The set of consistent formulas
will be denoted L.
If ¤ is a total pre-order (a total and transitive relation), then  is a notation for the
associated equivalence relation (a  b iff a ¤ b and b ¤ a), and   is the notation for the
associated strict order (a   b iff a ¤ b and b ¦ a).
2.2 The AGM Model
In the classical “AGM” theory, as presented by Carlos Alchourro´n, David Makinson and
Peter Ga¨rdenfors [AGM85], beliefs are represented by belief sets K (logically closed sets
of sentences) in a language L and a change consists on adding or removing a sentence to/
from a belief set in order to obtain a new belief set.
Provided that the belief set is consistent, the epistemic agent can have exactly three
epistemic attitudes towards a sentence α, each defined from the belief set:
1. α P K: belief in α;
2.  α P K: disbelief or rejection of α;
3. α R K and  α R K: suspension of belief or α unsettled.
Three operations were then defined:
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- Expansion: a sentence is added to the belief set and nothing is removed (represented as
 α or   α);
- Contraction: a sentence is removed from the belief set and nothing is added (represented
as α or  α);
- Revision: a new sentence is added to the belief set and at the same time other sentences
are removed if necessary to ensure the consistency of the revised set (represented as α
or  α).
Figure 2.1: The six types of belief change.
When talking of the different operations defined by the AGM model, one can see that
they are related: in the revision process new beliefs are incorporated (just as it happens
in expansion) but in order to preserve consistency some sentences have, sometimes, to be
eliminated (just as it happens with contraction).
The process of revising a belief is modeled as a function  from K  L to K and
K  α represents the revision of the belief set K (deductively closed set of formulas) by
the sentence α. In order to understand and define this process, eight postulates, known as
the AGM postulates, were described by the referred article authors:
(AGM1) K  α is a belief set
(AGM2) K  α $ α
(AGM3) K  α  K   α (where + represents the expansion operator)
(AGM4) If K &  α then K   α  K  α (i.e., K   α  K  α)
(AGM5) If &  α then K  α  KK
(AGM6) If $ αØ β then K  α  K  β
(AGM7) K  pα ^ βq  pK  αq   β
(AGM8) If K  α &  β then pK  αq   β  K  pα ^ βq
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K is a belief set, α and β are logical formulas belonging to the language L and  is
a binary operator for revision that takes the current beliefs and the new information and
produces a new belief set that represents the result of the revision.
The first AGM postulate states that the result of revising the belief set K with α is
still a belief set. This postulate is known as closure.
Postulate (AGM2), known as success, ensures that the new sentence is incorporated in
the revision, that is, α P K  α.
Success, in combination with the third postulate (known as inclusion), guarantees that
the revised belief set consists in the logical consequence of the new belief and a subset of
sentences of K that do not contradict the new belief.
The fourth postulate, vacuity, essentially says that if the new belief does not contradict
any of the sentences in K, there is no reason to remove any of them.
With the consistency fifth postulate, one can be sure that unless the new belief is itself
inconsistent, the result of the revision is consistent. Let us note that K  α is consistent
even if α is consistent. In this matter, revision differs from the process of update, which
we will refer to in Chapter 4.
The revision operation must be independent of the syntactic representation of the
sentences, that is, logically equivalent sentences must yield the same result. This is what
is stated by postulate (AGM6) or the extensionality criteria.
These six postulates form the basic AGM postulates for revision. The two following
ones, seventh and eight postulates are called superexpansion and subexpansion and
are presented in the terms of revision by a conjunction, but they are equivalent to a set
of postulates of revision by a disjunction as demonstrated by Peter Ga¨rdenfors in [Ga¨r88].
According to the AGM authors, if K is to be changed minimally so as to include two
sentences α and β, such a change should be possible by first revising K with respect
to α and then expandingKα by β, provided that β does not contradict the beliefs inKα.
2.3 The modified Katsuno and Mendelzon postulates
A few years after the publication of the “AGM” model, Hirofumi Katsuno and Alberto O.
Mendelzon rephrased its postulates using a propositional logic setting [KM91]. In other
words, they used a finite knowledge base instead of a knowledge set.
They represented a belief set by a sentence ϕ in a propositional language L, where
any sentence that is entailed by ϕ is part of the belief set. Evidence is also represented
using a sentence µ in L and the result of revising ϕ with µ is a sentence denoted by
ϕ  µ, where  is called a belief revision operator. The sentence ϕ  µ also belongs to the
language L.
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By representing any knowledge set K by a propositional formula ϕ such that
K  φ|ϕ $ φ, a direct correspondence between K  µ and ϕ  µ was established:
Lemma 1 [KM91] Let  be a revision operator on knowledge sets and  its correspond-
ing operator on knowledge bases. Then  satisfies (AGM1) - (AGM6) if and only if 
satisfies conditions (R1) - (R4) below:
(R1) ϕ  µ implies µ
(R2) If ϕ^ µ is satisfiable, then ϕ  µ  ϕ^ µ
(R3) If µ is satisfiable, then ϕ  µ is also satisfiable
(R4) If ϕ1  ϕ2 and µ1  µ2, then ϕ1  µ1  ϕ2  µ2
This lemma allows us to understand the first six AGM postulates, while the following
lemma redefines the remaining two:
Lemma 2 [KM91] (AGM7) and (AGM8) are equivalent to (R5) and (R6) respectively in
the sense of the previous Lemma:
(R5) pϕ  µq ^ φ implies ϕ  pµ^ φq
(R6) If pϕ  µq ^ φ is satisfiable, then ϕ  pµ^ φq implies pϕ  µq ^ φq
Along with this definition Katsuno and Mendelzon provided a representation theorem
that shows an equivalence between the postulates and a revision mechanism based on
total pre-orders. These are defined as:
Definition 1 [KM91] Let W be the set of all worlds (or interpretations) of a proposi-
tional language L. A function that maps each sentence ϕ in L to a total pre-order ¤ϕ on
worlds W is called a faithful assignment if and only if:
(1) ω1, ω2 |ù ϕ only if ω1 ϕ ω2
(2) ω1 |ù ϕ and ω2 * ϕ only if ω1  ϕ ω2
and
(3) ϕ  φ only if ¤ϕ¤φ
Here ω1  ϕ ω2 is defined as ω1 ¤ϕ ω2 and ω2 ¦ϕ ω1 and ω1 ϕ ω2 is defined as
ω1 ¤ϕ ω2 and ω2 ¤ϕ ω1.
Katsuno and Mendelzon’s representation theorem shows that a revision operator is
equivalent to a faithful assignment where the result of a revision ϕ  µ is determined by
µ and the total pre-order assigned to ϕ:
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Theorem 1 [KM91] A revision operator  satisfies postulates (R1) - (R6) precisely when
there exists a faithful assignment that maps each sentence ϕ into a total pre-order ¤ϕ
such that
Modspϕ  µq  minpModspµq,¤ϕq.
Where Modspµq is the set of all worlds satisfying µ and minpModspµq,¤ϕq contains
all worlds that are minimal in Modspµq according to the total pre-order ¤ϕ, i.e. all the
worlds that include µ and are closer to ϕ.
Figure 2.2 provides a graphical representation of the possible worlds approach1.
Figure 2.2: Belief Revision
2.4 Revision Models
The AGM paper authors proposed eight postulates that should be satisfied by any
reasonable revision function. Those postulates were formulated in a very general setting,
and were later transformed by Katsuno and Mendelzon, using a propositional logic
setting.
Throughout the years, several investigators presented definitions of concrete revision
operators. Some are able to satisfy the AGM postulates while others fail for some reason.
Below are some known revision operators proposals, that can be found in the literature
(for a summary on these please refer to [KM89]).
2.4.1 Dalal’s Revision
When talking of revision models, Dalal’s revision operator is one of the most important
ones. It uses the number of propositional letters on which two interpretations differ as a
1This graphical notation is due to Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez.
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measure of “distance” between them, thus inducing a new interpretation ordering.
Let us take two interpretations I and J and define the distance between them, distpI, Jq,
as the total number of propositional letters on which I and J differ. This distance, also
known as the Hamming distance is defined as:
distpI, Jq  |I4J |, where the |.| operator is set-cardinality.
The distance between a formula Modpϕq and an interpretation I is defined as:
distpModpϕq, Iq  minJPModpϕqdistpJ, Iq
A persistent assignment of a total pre-order¤ϕ can be determined as I ¤ϕ J if and only if:
distpModpϕq, Iq ¤ distpModpϕq, Jq
Finally, Dalal’s revision operator, D is as follows:
Modpϕ D µq  MinpModpµq,¤ϕq
This operator satisfies (AGM1)-(AGM8) postulates, thus satisfying Katsuno and
Mendelzon’s postulates as well.
2.4.2 Borgida’s Revision
The revision operator proposed by Borgida [Bor85] and later extended by Dalal [Dal88b]
orders interpretations according to the set-inclusion of symmetric set-differences. An
interpretation I can be thought as a set that only contains the propositional variables that
hold on I and the symmetric set-difference I4J of two interpretations I and J is the set
that contains all the propositional variables whose values differ in I and in J .
Therefore, given a formula µ and an interpretation I , the set of differences between
them can be defined as:
diffpI, µq  I4J |J P Modpµq
Borgida’s revision operator, B is defined as follows:
If ϕ^ µ is consistent, then ϕ B µ  ϕ^ µ;
Otherwise, J is a model of ϕ B µ if there is a model I of ϕ, such that
I4J PMinpdiffpI, µqq
This revision operator is known to satisfy (R1) - (R5) but not (R6).
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2.4.3 Winslett’s Revision
In 1988 Winslett [Win88] proposed a revision operator defined for the first order calculus
case and called possible models approach (PMA). Her starting point was the possible
worlds approach (PWA) proposed in 1987 by Ginsberg and Smith [GS88a, GS88b], and
that can be summed up as:
“To incorporate a set S of formulas into a theory T , take the maximal subset T 1 of T
that is consistent with S, and add S to T 1”, or, in other words: “as little as possible in the
description of the world changes when an action is performed”.
PMA is actually very similar to PWA: when using PMA it’s the models of T (instead
of the formulas of T ) that are to be changed as little as possible to make S true.
Let us define the function IncorporatepS,Mq, the set of models produced by incorporat-
ing S into M :
Let M be a model of T and let S be a set of formulas. IncorporatepS,Mq is the set of all
models M 1 such that:
1. S and the protected formulas of T are true in M 1;
2. No other model satisfying 1. differs from M on fewer atoms, where fewer is defined
by set inclusion.
The possible sates of the world resulting from applying an action with postconditions
S are given by:

MPModelspT q
IncorporatepS,Mq
Let us restrict this operator, pma, to the propositional case. If the old knowledge
base is inconsistent with the new knowledge, pma coincides with Borgida’s operator B.
However, even if the new knowledge is consistent with the knowledge base, Winslett
defines pma in the same way. Thus, pma violates condition (R2).
2.4.4 Satoh’s Revision
The revision operator proposed by Satoh [Sat88] is defined in first order logic and if
applied to the propositional logic case corresponds to a global version of Borgida’s
revision operator.
Given two formulas ϕ and µ, the set of differences between them is defined as:
diffpϕ, µq 

IPModpϕq
diffpI, µq
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Satoh defines an interpretation J to be a model of ϕ S µ if there exists a model I of
ϕ such that I4J is a minimal element of diffpϕ, µq.
Satoh’s revision operator, S satisfies (R1) - (R5) but not (R6).
2.4.5 Weber’s Revision
Weber’s revision operator [Web86] also concentrates on sets of propositional letters on
which a model of ϕ and a model of µ differ and can be defined as:
If ϕ and µ are both satisfiable, then ϕ W µ is defined by resΩ ^ µ, where Ω is the union
of the minimal sets of diffpϕ, µq.
If either ϕ or µ is unsatisfiable, then ϕ W µ is defined as ϕ.
If ϕ and µ are both consistent, Weber’s revision operator satisfies (R1) - (R4) but not (R5)
nor (R6).
Chapter 3
Iterated belief revision
3.1 Definition
Although the AGM paper was of most importance to the development of the area of
belief revision, their postulates were not sufficient to ensure the rational preservation of
conditional beliefs, that is, the sequential revision of beliefs in response to a string of
observations. The AGM postulates are not able to capture the dynamics of the structure
used to encode one-step revision policies and are, therefore, too weak to properly regulate
iterated belief revision.
Figure 3.1: AGM doesn’t provide insight to iteration.
With this in mind Adnan Darwiche and Judea Pearl wrote an article [DP96] in which
they propose that revision functions should operate on belief states (also referred as epis-
temic states) rather than belief sets. While belief sets characterize the set of propositions
that an agent holds, belief states also contains the logical consequences of those proposi-
tions, including the strategy that the agent wishes to employ at that given time. This strat-
egy is equivalent to conditional beliefs: beliefs that one is prepared to accept conditioned
on the existence of some evidence. Darwiche and Pearl formally define an epistemic state
as:
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Definition 2 An epistemic state Ψ is an object to which we associate a consistent propo-
sitional formula BpΨq that denotes the current beliefs of the agent in the epistemic state
Ψ. Let us denote by E the set of epistemic states.
One can conclude that belief states are richer than belief sets and even that two
identical belief sets can behave differently under revision, depending on how the strategy
is to be modified by each new evidence.
Along with this modification to the AGM framework, that enables belief revision to be a
function of epistemic states, Darwiche and Pearl also proposed four additional postulates
that allow that only the conditional beliefs that don’t compromise propositional beliefs
will be preserved.
Darwiche and Pearl start by presenting a modification to the KM postulates earlier
referred: (R1)-(R6). This modification is achieved by a weakening of postulate (R4)
allowing belief revision to be a function of an epistemic state:
(R*1) BpΨ  µq implies µ
(R*2) If BpΨq ^ µ is satisfiable, then BpΨ  µq  BpΨq ^ µ
(R*3) If µ is satisfiable, then BpΨ  µ) is also satisfiable
(R*4) If Ψ1  Ψ2 and µ1  µ2, then Ψ1  µ1  Ψ2  µ2
(R*5) pBpΨ  µqq ^ φ implies BpΨ  pµ^ φqq
(R*6) If pBpΨ  µqq ^ φ is satisfiable, then BpΨ  pµ^ φqq implies pBpΨ  µqq ^ φ
Where BpΨq is a propositional sentence that defines the belief set associated to
each epistemic state Ψ.
As pointed, postulate (R*4) requires the epistemic states to be identical in order to let
them lead to equivalent belief sets when revised by equivalent evidence.
The four additional postulates proposed by these authors were the following:
(C1) If α |ù µ then pΨ  µq  α  Ψ  α
(C2) If α |ù  µ, then pΨ  µq  α  Ψ  α
(C3) If BpΨ  αq $ µ, then BppΨ  µq  αq $ µ
(C4) If BpΨ  αq &  µ, then BppΨ  µq  αq &  µ
Postulate (C1) states that the later evidence α cannot discredit the previous evi-
dence µ because α entails µ or, in other words, evidence α alone can yield the same belief
set, making evidence µ redundant. Postulate (C2) allows the later evidence α to discredit
the previous evidence µ due to the fact that α logically contradicts µ and, as before,
evidence α alone would yield the same belief set. Postulate (C3) on the other hand,
retains evidence µ after accommodating the more recent evidence α given that α implies
µ under current beliefs. Lastly, postulate (C4) stipulates that if µ is not contradicted after
seeing α then it should remain uncontradicted when α is preceded by µ itself.
Postulates (C1)-(C4) have a correspondence in terms of total preorders:
Theorem 2 [DP96] Suppose that a revision operator satisfies postulates (R*1)-(R*6).
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The operator satisfies postulates (C1)-(C4) iff the operator and its corresponding faithful
assignment satisfy:
(CR1) If ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù µ, then ω1 ¤Ψ ω2 iff ω1 ¤Ψµ ω2
(CR2) If ω1 |ù  µ and ω2 |ù  µ, then ω1 ¤Ψ ω2 iff ω1 ¤Ψµ ω2
(CR3) If ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù  µ, then ω1  Ψ ω2 only if ω1  Ψµ ω2
(CR4) If ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù  µ, then ω1 ¤Ψ ω2 only if ω1 ¤Ψµ ω2
According to (CR1), the order among the µ-worlds remains unchanged after revision
by µ and (CR2) maintains the order among the  µ-worlds after revision by µ . (CR3)
says that if a µ-world is strictly preferred to a  µ-world, then that strict preference is
maintained after revision by µ. By (CR4) if a µ-world is weakly preferred to a  µ-world,
then that weak preference is maintained after revision by µ.
Figure 3.2: An example of a belief revision function satisfying (CR1)-(CR4).
3.2 Iterable Operators
3.2.1 Independence Postulate
Although (C1)-(C4) set the stage for iterated revision, some authors (Booth and Meyer
[BM06] and Jin and Thielscher [JT07]) have indicated that these postulates are too per-
missive since they do not rule out operators by which all newly acquired information is
given up as soon as an agent learns a fact that contradicts some of its current beliefs. In
order to circumvent this they proposed the independence postulate:
(Ind) If ϕ  α &  µ, then pϕ  µq  α $ µ
This postulate is clearly stronger than (C3) and (C4). Postulates (C1), (C2) and
(Ind) were considered characteristics of a family of operators called admissible revision
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operators [BM06]. In terms of total pre-orders, (Ind) corresponds to the following
postulate:
(CRInd) For ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù  µ, if ω1 ¤Ψ ω2 then ω1  Ψµ ω2
Figure 3.3: An example of an admissible revision function.
3.2.2 Conservative and Lexicographic Revision
Iterable operators can be divided into three classes, according to their ability to remember
the revision history and to take it into account: operators with full memory, operators
without memory and operators with partial memory.
Operators With Full Memory: The full history of passed changes is conserved al-
lowing for rollbacks of previous changes. Operators of this kind have been proposed
by Brewka [Bre91] and Lehmann [Leh95], among others.
Operators Without Memory: Each belief set is revised in a certain way, without any
influence from previous changes. This class of operators was studied by Areces and
Becher [AB01].
Operators With Partial Memory: The way a belief set was arrived at influences
future revisions, although the information remembered is not sufficient to identity
previous states. In the literature, most of the proposed iterable operators belong to
this class.
The following two revision operators belong to the latter referred class and satisfy the
DP-postulates (C1)-(C4):
Conservative revision, originally called natural revision, has been studied by
Boutilier [Bou93, Bou96] and Rott [Rot03]. This operation is conservative in the
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sense that it only makes the minimal changes of the preorder that are needed to
accept the input. In revision by µ, the minimal µ-worlds are moved to the bottom
of the preorder which is otherwise left unchanged. The main characteristic of this
operator is:
(Nat) If Ψ  µ $  α, then pΨ  µq  α  Ψ  α
And in terms of total pre-orders:
(CRNat) If ω1 R rrΨ  µss and ω2 R rrΨ  µss, then ω1 ¤Ψ ω2 ô ω1 ¤Ψµ ω2
Lexicographic revision, also called Moderate revision, was proposed by Nayak in
[Nay94b] and deeply studied by Nayak, Pagnucco and Peppas [NPP03]. When
revising by µ the preorder is rearranged by putting the µ-worlds at bottom (but
conserving their relative order) and the  µ-worlds at top (but conserving their
relative order). It has the following property.
(Lex) If α &  µ, then pΨ  µq  α $ µ
Becoming the following, when using total pre-orders:
(CRLex) If ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù  µ, then ω1  Ψµ ω2
Figure 3.4: An example of Natural Revision (left) and Lexicographic revision (right).
Rott [Rot09] identified a third type of iterable revision operators, known as Radical
revision, that we are not addressing in this dissertation.
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Chapter 4
The Katsuno and Mendelzon Update
4.1 Definition
In their 1992 paper [KM92] Hirofumi Katsuno and Albert O. Mendelzon demonstrate an
important result. They make a formal and fundamental distinction between two kinds of
modifications that can be applied to a knowledge base: revision and update.
While revision is used when obtaining new information about a static world, that is,
changes take place at the knowledge level, update brings the knowledge base up to date
when the world described by it changes.
Intuitively one can understand the difference between the postulates for revision and
update as follows:
Suppose that we have a knowledge base ϕ and we want to revise it with the sentence
µ. Using revision methods, which satisfy the AGM postulates, the system is going to
select from all the models of µ those that are closest to the models of ϕ. The theory ϕ  µ
is then defined by these selected models.
When speaking of update methods, what we have is a selection that chooses, for every
model M of the knowledge base ϕ, the set of models that are closest to M : the newly
obtained theory ϕ  µ (where  represents the update operator) describes the union of all
such models.
Grahne [Gra91] explained update the following way:
“Since we are confined to our set of possibilities, we must make the change
come true in all of our candidate worlds. Semantically, we change each of
the possible worlds ‘as little as possible’ in order to make the new state of
affairs hold. Our new syntactic description of the worlds of interest should
now correctly reflect the outcome of this set of changes. The function that
maps the old description to the new is called an update.”
Keeping in mind all that was mentioned earlier about revision and its postulates,
Katsuno and Mendelzon presented the following postulates for update [KM92]:
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(U1) ϕ  µ implies µ
(U2) If ϕ implies µ then ϕ  µ is equivalente to ϕ
(U3) If both ϕ and µ are satisfiabel then ϕ  µ is also satisfiable
(U4) If ϕ1  ϕ2 and µ1  µ2 then ϕ1  µ1  ϕ2  µ2
(U5) pϕ  µq ^ φ implies ϕ  pµ^ φq
(U6) If ϕ  µ1 implies µ2 and ϕ  µ2 implies µ1 then ϕ  µ1  ϕ  µ2
(U7) If ϕ is complete then pϕ  µ1q ^ pϕ  µ2q implies ϕ  pµ1 _ µ2q
(U8) pϕ1 _ ϕ2q  µ  pϕ1  µq _ pϕ2  µq
We can observe that postulates (U1)-(U5) directly correspond to the postulates
(R1)-(R5) presented in chapter 2.
The following theorem, also proved by Katsuno and Mendelzon, shows that all update
operators defined by a partial pre-order can be captured by the proposed postulates:
Theorem 3 [KM92] Let  be an update operator. The following conditions are equiva-
lent:
1. The update operator  satisfies conditions (U1)-(U8);
2. There exists a faithful assignment that maps each interpretation I to a partial pre-order
¤I such that
Modpϕ  µq 

IPModpϕq
MinpModpµq,¤Iq
Figure 4.1: An example of an update operator
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4.2 Update Operators
Having presented the definition of Update according to Katsuno and Mendelzon, and
similarly to what was presented in Section 2.4, in this section we present some proposals
for update operators that can be found in the literature.
These operators have different strengths and complexity and a more thorough description
can be found in the works of Andreas Herzig and Omar Rifi [HR98, HR99].
4.2.1 PMA
Winslett [Win88] introduced the Possible Models Approach (PMA) in 1988, in the
context of reasoning about action and change. This operator is based on the minimization
of the distance between interpretations. It is interesting to note that Winslett’s work is
prior to Katsuno and Mendelzon’s concept of update.
Let ϕ be the belief base and µ the new belief, then the PMA update operator is
described as:
Modpϕ pma µq 

IPModpϕq
MinpModpµq, Iq
Where Modpµq represents the set of models of the formula µ and MinpModpµq, Iq the
subset of models of µ that are closest to I .
In this model the proximity relation between two models I1 and I2 and an in-
terpretation I is defined by a partial order ¤I such that I1 ¤I I2 if and only if
diffpI, I1q  diffpI, I2q. diffpA,Bq represents the set of propositions in which A and B
differ.
This said, J P MinpModpµq, Iq if and only if J is minimal in Modpµq regarding ¤I , that
is, it doesn’t exist J 1 P Modpµq such that J 1 ¤I J .
It can be proved that the PMA update operator satisfies postulates (U1)-(U8).
4.2.2 FORBUS
The operator proposed by Forbus [For89] is stronger than the PMA operator and is the
update counterpart of Dalal’s semantics for belief revision (see section 2.4.1).
Forbus operator calculates distances and preferences between the models of the belief
base ϕ and the new information µ. Let w be a model of ϕ and u1, u2 two models of µ.
The total order ¤w between models is given by:
ui ¤w uj iff |distpw, uiq| ¤ |distpw, ujq|,
where |distpw, uq| represents the cardinality of the distance between the models. The
models are selected according to this relation and its union constitutes the new belief base.
This update operator also satisfies postulates (U1)-(U8).
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4.2.3 MCD
In 1996 Zhang and Foo [ZF96] proposed the MCD (Minimal Change with Disjunc-
tive information) operator which deals with the problem of disjunction in the PMA model.
Let ϕ be a knowledge base and µ a propositional formula. The update operator defined
by Zhang and Foo, ϕ MCD µ, is defined by:
(1) ϕ MCD µ  ϕ if ϕ entails µ or ϕ is inconsistent
(2) Modspϕ MCD µq 

SPModelspϕq
RespS, µqMCD, otherwise
Where RespS, µqMCD represents the set of all possible states of the world resulting from
updating a state of the world, S, with µ, using the MCD model.
The MCD update operator doesn’t satisfy postulates (U5) and (U7), although it satis-
fies all the remaining ones.
Chapter 5
Iteration for KM-update
5.1 Definition
As we mentioned, a KM-update operator  is defined for all the possible belief sets ϕ.
Consequently, in a first view, iteration does not seem to require a special attention, since
pϕ  αq  β is well defined. However, what happens if we want to make changes in our
preferences as a consequence of updating by α? In that case we need to define a new
kind of operator α to reflect these changes. This implies that, pϕ αq  β and ϕ α β will
be, in general, different operations.
In order to differentiate these new operators from the original KM operators we will
use the notation s, where s  tα1, . . . , αnu is a sequence of updates. If s  H, we will
denote , if s  tαu we will denote α. (U1)-(U8) will remain unchanged for the new
class of operators.
In order to define iteration of update we start by adapting the Darwiche and Pearl’s
(C1)-(C4) postulates:
(CU1) If α $ µ then ϕ µ α  ϕ  α
(CU2) If α $  µ then ϕ µ α  ϕ  α
(CU3) If ϕ  α $ µ then ϕ µ α $ µ
(CU4) If ϕ  α &  µ then ϕ µ α &  µ
Basically, the only change needed is to replace the revision operator by update and
readjust the notation. In this case, all the additional structure that was needed in belief
revision, resides in the operator . Consequently, a belief state can be defined by the pair
pϕ, q.
In terms of faithful assignment, the corresponding (CR) properties, where the
definition of faithful assignment must be adapted to belief states (i.e., by using ¤t,ωu
instead of ¤ω), are:
(CRU1) If ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù µ, then ω1 ¤t,ωu ω2 ô ω1 ¤tµ,ωu ω2
(CRU2) If ω1 |ù  µ and ω2 |ù  µ, then ω1 ¤t,ωu ω2 ô ω1 ¤tµ,ωu ω2
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(CRU3) If ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù  µ, then ω1  t,ωu ω2 implies ω1  tµ,ωu ω2
(CRU4) If ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù  µ, then ω1 ¤t,ωu ω2 implies ω1 ¤tµ,ωu ω2
(CRU1)-(CRU2) require that the order among µ-worlds and the order among the  µ-
worlds remains unchanged after update by µ in all of the preorders defined for each ωi. In
the same way, (CRU3) says that if a µ-world is strictly preferred to a  µ-world, then that
strict preference is maintained after revision by µ in all of the preorders defined for each
ωi and finally (CRU4) says that if a µ-world is weakly preferred to a  µ-world, then that
weak preference is maintained after update by µ in all of the preorders defined for each
ωi.
The next theorem proves our last assertion.
Proposition 1 s is an update operator if and only if there exists a faithful assignment
that maps each possible world ω to a partial pre-order  ts,ωu such that:
rrϕ s αss 

ω|ùϕ minprrαss,¤ts,ωuq
.
Theorem 4 Let s be an update operator. Then:
1. s satisfies (CU1) iff its corresponding faithful assignment satisfies (CRU1)
2. s satisfies (CU2) iff its corresponding faithful assignment satisfies (CRU2)
3. s satisfies (CU3) iff its corresponding faithful assignment satisfies (CRU3)
4. s satisfies (CU4) iff its corresponding faithful assignment satisfies (CRU4)
Proof: 1
(CU1)ô (CRU1)
pñq Assume (CU1) holds and let ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù µ. Let α  αtω1,ω2u Then α $ µ
and due to (CU1) ϕ µ α  ϕ  α. Hence minptω1, ω2u,¤t,ωuq  minptω1, ω2u,¤tµ,ωuq
from which it follows that ω1 ¤t,ωu ω2 ô ω1 ¤tµ,ωu ω2.
pðq Assume (CRU1) holds and let α $ µ. We want to show that ϕ µ α  ϕ  α.
Condition pCRU1q implies that ¤t,ωu and ¤tµ,ωu are equivalent for all ω
1 P rrαss since
rrαss  rrµss. Hence:
rrϕ  αss 

ω|ùϕ minprrαss,¤t,ωuq
rrϕ  αss 

ω|ùϕ minprrαss,¤tµ,ωuq
rrϕ  αss  rrϕ µ αss
(CU2)ô (CRU2). The proof is symmetric with the one above.
1Adapted from [[DP96], Proof of Theorem 13]. For the sake of simplicity, we will use in the proofs 
instead of s, since the subscript is not necessary for the proofs.
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(CU3)ô (CRU3)
pñq Assume (CU3) holds and let ω1 |ù µ, ω2 |ù  µ and ω1  t,ωu ω2. Let α  αtω1,ω2u.
Then rrαω  αss  minprrαss,¤t,ωuq  tω1u, from which it follows that αω  α $ µ. By
(CU3) αω µ α $ µ, from which it follows that rrαω µ αss  minprrαss,¤tµ,ωuq  rrµss,
hence rrαω µ αss  tω1u, from which we can conclude that ω1  tµ,ωu ω2.
pðq Assume (CRU3) holds and let ϕ α $ µ. From rrϕ  αss 

ω|ùϕ minprrαss,¤t,ωuq
it follows that for all ω |ù ϕ if ω1 P minprrαss,¤t,ωuq implies that ω1 |ù α ^ µ and
for all ω2 |ù α ^  µ it follows that ω1  t,ωu ω2.(CRU3) yields ω1  tµ,ωu ω
2 for all
ω2 |ù α ^  µ, hence ω2 R minprrαss,¤tµ,ωuq. Since this is valid for all ω |ù ϕ we can
conclude that ϕ µ α $ µ.
(CU4)ô (CRU4)
pñq Assume (CU4) holds and let ω1 |ù µ, ω2 |ù  µ and ω1 ¤t,ωu ω2. Let α  αtω1,ω2u.
Then ω1 P rrαω  αss  minprrαss,¤t,ωuq, from which it follows that αω  α &  µ.
By (CU4) αω µ α &  µ, from which it follows that rrαω µ αss X rrµss  H, i.e.,
minprrαss,¤tµ,ωuq X rrµss  H, hence ω1 P rrαω µ αss, from which we can conclude
that ω1 ¤tµ,ωu ω2.
pðqAssume (CRU4) holds and let ϕα &  µ. From rrϕ  αss 

ω|ùϕ minprrαss,¤t,ωu
q it follows that there exists υ such that υ |ù ϕ and for some ω1 P minprrαss,¤t,υuq it holds
that ω1 |ù α ^ µ and for all ω2 |ù α ^  µ it follows that ω1 ¤t,υu ω2. (CRU4) yields
ω1 ¤tµ,υu ω
2 for all ω2 |ù α ^ µ, hence ω1 P minprrαss,¤tµ,υuq, from which it follows
that ω1 P

ω|ùϕ minprrαss,¤tµ,ωuq. Hence ϕ µ α &  µ.
At this point, an important difference between iteration of revision and iteration of
update appears. In belief revision, AGM, without the iteration postulates, didn’t provide
any insight about the new preorder. On the other hand, α, without any change w.r.t. tu
is well defined and satisfies (CU1)-(CU4):
Proposition 2 Let s be an update operator and let α  tu. Then α satisfies (CU1)-
(CU4).
For that reason, the claims pointed out by Booth and Meyer [BM06] and Jin and
Thielscher [JT07] gain a new importance in update. The corresponding independence
postulate for iterated update is
(U-Ind) If ϕ is a complete formula and ϕ  α &  µ, then ϕ µ α $ µ
which corresponds, in terms of faithful assignments, to the following property (see an
example in Figure 5.1):
(CRUInd) If ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù  µ, then ω1 ¤t,ωu ω2 ñ ω1  tµ,ωu ω2
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Figure 5.1: An example of an update operator satisfying (CU1)-(CU4) and (C-Ind) of
rrϕ  αss.
Theorem 5 Let s be an update operator. Then s satisfies(U-Ind) iff its corresponding
faithful assignment satisfies (CRUInd).
Proof:
(U-Ind)ô (CRUInd)
pñq Assume (U-Ind) holds and let ω1 |ù µ, ω2 |ù  µ and ω1 ¤t,ωu ω2. Let α  αtω1,ω2u.
Then ω1 P rrαω  αss  minprrαss,¤t,ωuq, from which it follows that αω  α &  µ. By
(U-Ind) αω µα $ µ, from which it follows that rrαω µ αss  minprrαss,¤tµ,ωuq  rrµss,
hence rrαω µ αss  tω1u, from which we can conclude that ω1  tµ,ωu ω2.
pðq Assume (CRInd) holds and and let ϕ be a complete formula such that ϕ  α &
 µ. Since ϕ is complete, there exists some υ such that ϕ  αυ. Then rrϕ  αss 
minprrαss,¤t,υuq. Due to ϕ  α &  µ it follows that there exits ω1 P minprrαss,¤t,ωuq
such that ω1 |ù α ^ µ and for all ω2 |ù α ^  µ it follows that ω1 ¤t,υu ω2. (CRUInd)
yields ω1  tµ,υu ω
2 for all ω2 |ù α^ µ, hence ω1 P minprrαss,¤tµ,υuq and there ω
2 not
exists such that ω2 |ù α ^ µ and ω2 P minprrαss,¤tµ,υuq. Hence ϕ µ α $ µ.
Proposition 3 Let  be an update operator satisfying (C-Ind). Then, in general, α  tu.
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5.2 Two families of KM-update
In this subsection we show how to define (as in belief revision) natural and lexicographic
update. First we need to adapt the postulates formerly defined:
(U-Nat) If ϕ is a complete formula and ϕ  µ $  α, then ϕ µ α  ϕ  α
(U-Lex) If ϕ $  α and α &  µ, then ϕ µ α $ µ
and then provide their correspondent postulates in terms of possible worlds:
(CRUNat) If ω1, ω2 |ù  pϕ  µq, then ω1 ¤t,ωu ω2 ô ω1 ¤tµ,ωu ω2
(CRULex) If ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù  µ, then ω1  tµ,ωu ω2 for all ω  ω2
The following representation theorem shows the equivalences:
Theorem 6 Let  be an update operator. Let f be its corresponding faithful assignment,
i.e., such that
rrϕ  αss 

ω|ùϕ minprrαss,¤t,ωuq
Then:
1.  satisfies(U-Nat) iff the faithful assignment satisfies (CRUNat)
2.  satisfies(U-Lex) iff the faithful assignment satisfies (CRULex)
Proof:
(U-Nat)ô (CRUNat)
pñqAssume (U-Nat) holds and let ω1, ω2 |ù  pϕµq. Let α  αtω1,ω2u. Then α $  ϕµ
from which it follows that ϕ  µ $  α and (by U-Nat) ϕ µ α  ϕ  α. Since ϕ is
a complete formula, there exists υ such that αυ  ϕ. Hence minptω1, ω2u,¤t,υuq 
minptω1, ω2u,¤tµ,υuq from which it follows that ω1 ¤t,υu ω2 ô ω1 ¤tµ,υu ω2.
pðq Assume (CRUNat) holds and and let ϕ be a complete formula such that ϕ µ $  α.
Since ϕ is complete there exists υ such that ϕ  αυ. Then rrϕ  αss  minprrαss,¤t,υuq.
We have that rrαss |ù  pϕ  µq. Condition (CRUNat) implies that ¤t,υu and ¤tµ,υu are
equivalent for all ω1 P rrαss. Hence:
rrϕ  αss  minprrαss,¤t,υuq
rrϕ  αss  minprrαss,¤tµ,υuq
rrϕ  αss  rrϕ µ αss
(U-Lex)ô (CRULex)
pñq Assume (U-Lex) holds and let ω1 |ù µ and ω2 |ù  µ. Let α  αtω1,ω2u. Then
α &  µ. Let ϕ be a complete formula such that ϕ $  α. Then ϕ  αω2 . Then it
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follows by (U-Lex) that ϕ µ α $ µ. Since ϕ is complete there exists υ  ω2 such that
ϕ  αυ. Then rrϕ µ αss  minprrαss,¤tµ,υuq. Since rrϕ µ αss  rrµss it follows that
minprrαss,¤tµ,υuq  tω1u. Hence ω1  tµ,υu ω2.
pðq Assume (CRULex) holds and let ϕ, α and µ such that ϕ $  α and α &  µ.
ϕ  αtω1, . . . , ωnu, for ω1, . . . , ωn P W . Then tω1, . . . , ωnu  rr αss. Then ωi R
minprrαss,¤tµ,ωiuq, for i  1, . . . , n. It follows from (CRULex) that ωj  tµ,ωiu ωk for
all ωj |ù µ and ωk |ù  µ, k  i and i  1, . . . , n. Then minprrαss,¤tµ,ωiuqXrr µss  H.
Hence ϕ µ α $ µ.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The main purpose of this dissertation was to propose a model for iteration of update,
using the definition of this type of modification given by Katsuno and Mendelzon in their
work.
Perhaps a question that may arise is whether iterated update is worth investigating.
We believe it is! Iterated update is of the most importance when used in A.I. and there
are not so many works on this theme as there are on iterated revision.
This dissertation started with the definition of the AGM theory: the basic work than
broadened the study of belief change. And throughout out it we tried to summarize all
the key subjects that allowed us to construct our model.
Originated in two large research areas, philosophy and computer science, the belief
change study has become the subject of the work of a considerable number of investiga-
tors. Several extensions and generalizations have been suggested as well as important
applications and connections with other areas.
One of this extensions is iterated change: the AGM framework does not ensure the
rational preservation of conditional beliefs. In order to allow the sequential revision of
beliefs in response to a string of observations, Darwiche and Pearl proposed four new
postulates that have proven to be accurate, when used together with a subtle but major
transformation by which the revision functions operate on belief states rather than belief
sets.
Our goal was to adapt the Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates for iterated belief revision to
the case of iterated update.
According to the proposed definition, it is possible to create a sequence of updates
that play an important role on how the new belief state will be updated.
There is, however, a big difference in simply applying the original update operator to the
updated belief set or using the approach we propose: formally, pϕ αq  β and ϕ α β can
be different.
Example 1 Let P  tα, βu and the correspondent possible worlds W  tω1, ω2, ω3, ω4u
defined as
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ω1  rrtα, βuss.
ω2  rrtα, βuss.
ω3  rrt α, βuss.
ω4  rrt α, βuss.
Let  be an update operator satisfying (CU1)-(CU4) and (U-Ind). Let ϕ   β, i.e.,
rrϕss  tω2, ω4u. Consider the total preorders represented in Figure 5.1. Then:
rrϕ  αss  tω2u.
rrpϕ  αq  βss  tω1, ω3u.
rrϕ α βss  tω1u.
Figure 6.1: The total preorders associated to Example 1.
By using a new operator α we are able to reflect the changes in our preferences as a
consequence of updating by α and with the proposed postulates a consistent outcome is
presumedly achieved.
Postulates (CRU1)-(CRU4), (CRUInd), (CRUNat) and (CRULex), which allow for
the definition of large families of update operators, were also defined.
New postulates can, obviously, be added in order to specify a new operator. For instance,
we can define an update operator  that satisfies (CRU1)-(CRU2), (CRUInd) and
(CRUSoft) If ω1 |ù µ, ω2 |ù  µ then ω2  t,ωu ω1 ñ ω2 ¤tµ,ωu ω1
This postulate only allows for little (soft) changes in the preorder (this property comes
from improvement operators [KP08].). If a model of  µ is just a little more plausible
than a model of µ regarding ω then, after an update, the two models will have the same
plausibility.
The use of different postulates can help in the definition of different behaviors. For
instance, the previous update function satisfies tα,βu  tβ,αu.
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In this dissertation only functions and postulates adapted from belief revision to
update were studied. However, due to the intrinsic differences between update and
revision, we believe an interesting future point is to explore new proper iterated update
functions.
The results of this work will be published in the book “Foundations of Formal Ratio-
nality: Essays Dedicated to Gabriele Kern-Isberner on the Occasion of Her 60th Birthday”
of the College Publications Tribute series.
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